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Abstract
Experimental and behavioral economics are well established branches in the eco-
nomic science. This essay presents and discusses some results and behavioral regu-
larities from these fields which are of potential importance for public policy. After
a brief introduction of what experimental and behavioral economics is, some be-
havioral regularities as presentation and framing effects, pro-social behavior, and
reciprocity are introduced and it is reported how they interact with prominent trad-
ing institutions, taxation, and social and individual well-being. Throughout some
implications for public policy are discussed.
∗This is a strongly revised and up-dated version of the inaugural lecture ‘Facts and Fiction in Public
Policy: How Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform Public Policy and partly also based on
the keynote lecture ‘Sociality and Institutions’ provided at the CESifo ‘Venice Summer Institute Workshop
on Behavioral Public Economics’ on July 8, 2009. I thank the organizers of this workshop for their
hospitality.
“After consulting my advisory board of experimental and behavioral economists,
I am confident that the reframing proposed in the new public policy program
will increase subjective well-being by 34 percent and pro-social orientation by
27 percent at almost no cost.” (taken from Amir et al., 2005, re-phrased by the
author)
1 Introduction
Despite the largely unpredicted recent financial crises and accompanied economic down-
turn, most, if not all, recent public policy choices still rely on the traditional economic
concept of rational economic man and woman, the homo economicus. Interesting exam-
ples in this respect are recent reforms in the Netherlands concerning the health insurance
market and the markets for the supply of gas and electricity. In all cases important prin-
ciples of the reforms were (i) more competition between suppliers, and (ii) more choice
possibilities for the consumers. The main arguments in favor of such reforms are based
on the received wisdom among economists that increased competition and an enhanced
choice set for consumers is ultimately (consumer) welfare increasing.
To a large extent the presumed positive outcomes rely on the assumption that con-
sumers will exercise their power to choose. For the energy market reform in the Nether-
lands, the expectations about the exercise of consumer power have been largely disap-
pointed, however. At least if one measures this power by the fraction of consumers switch-
ing the supplier, because only a negligible fraction of consumers switched to an alternative
electricity or gas provider. After the reform of the health insurance sector consumers
seemed to take up their power to choose, though. It was reported that with the introduc-
tion of the new health insurance system in total 21 percent of consumers have changed
their insurance company (de Jong et al., 2008). However, also this switching behavior
looks less impressive if one takes into account that a majority of those individuals who
switched the insurance company did this within a so-called collective agreement where the
employer (or another collective) and not the individual chooses the insurance company.
Finally, only about 9 percent of all ‘switchers’ decided to do so on an individual basis.
Furthermore, in 2008 the percentage of people switching their health insurance provider
decreased to a mere 4 percent (NIVEL, 2009).
However, any well-trained economist will argue that (non-)switching behavior per se
does not yet mean that consumers did not make the correct choices. Indeed, revealed
preference theory states that those who did not switch simply reveal that they had already
chosen their utility maximizing insurance package and/or energy supplier and, hence, had
no reason to switch.
But let us be a little bit skeptical and ask if there is any way to assess if consumers
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indeed made ‘good’ choices. Unfortunately, there is no study (at least I am aware of) that
investigates this question for the mentioned recent reforms in the Netherlands in a sys-
tematic way. Yet, an evaluation of a similar reform of the Swedish social security system
in 2000 may help us to get some clues about how such reforms may work out and whether
consumers indeed make the good choices traditional economic theory assumes. Cronqvist
and Thaler (2004) (see also Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, ch. 9) investigated consumer choice
behavior after the introduction of the new system. In this system participants are allowed
to choose their own portfolios, but there is also one ‘default’ fund that is selected auto-
matically for those who do not actively choose. The authors asked if, compared to the
default, active choices are better choices. They conclude that “it would be hard to make
the case on an ex ante basis that the actively selected portfolios were better than the
default fund”(Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004, p. 427).1 In addition, in the first three years as
well as up to 2007 the actively chosen funds did also worse in terms of returns (see Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008, p. 427). Another interesting observation is that after the Swedish
government reduced the campaigns advertising active choice most people (90 percent) opt
for the default fund and almost nobody makes any changes to the chosen portfolio or
switches the chosen fund.2
This study strongly suggests that consumers do not (always) make the wise choices
traditional economic models assume. However, there are too many unobservables (e.g.,
risk preferences, self-selection effects) that may influence behavior and one may not want
to draw too strong conclusions from this field evidence. Therefore, in the remainder of this
contribution I shall present ‘clean’ evidence that standard assumptions of economic models
are indeed often violated and argue that neglecting the observed ‘non-standard’ behavioral
regularities will lead to wrong predictions and worse public policy than necessary. The
plan of the rest of paper is as follows. First, I will shortly discuss what experimental and
behavioral economics is. Then I shall present important examples of violations of stan-
dard behavioral assumptions based on questionnaire studies and laboratory experiments.
Thereafter, I shall link up these observations with questions concerning public economics
and public policy. Finally, I shall present some ideas about interesting and important
further research directions.
1In particular, in comparison to the default fund, actively chosen portfolios contained a higher equity
exposure and much more local concentration (e.g., almost 50 percent of the equities are from Swedish
firms), required more active management, and had higher fees.
2When the system was introduced in 2000 two-thirds of participants actively selected a portfolio on
their own. Interestingly, the proportion of people actively choosing their own portfolio decreased to 17.6
percent in 2001 and to only 8 percent in 2006.
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2 Experimental and behavioral economics
“The principle of science, the definition almost, is the following: The test of
all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific ‘truth’.”
(Feynman, 1964, chapter 1)
What precisely is experimental economics? As the name suggests it is the branch of
economics that uses experiments to investigate human behavior in economic decision sit-
uations. Experimental economics is a method that brings real people to the laboratory
(or the field) where they make real choices with which they earn (or lose) real money
(Plott, 1982). An important feature of the method of economic experimentation, which
distinguishes it from traditional empirical economic research, is that experiments allow the
researcher to tightly control the environment in which people make choices. The control-
lable components of this environment comprise technologies, initial endowments, action
spaces, timing of actions, accessible information, context and to some limited, but impor-
tant, extent also preferences. Varying these elements in a controlled and ceteris paribus
way allows causal inference and isolation of true causes of change in human behavior to
an extent unattainable by other methods of investigation. Additionally, laboratory ex-
periments can be replicated by other researchers under the same or different conditions,
thereby assessing the robustness of obtained results. As economists, however, we know
that there is nothing like a ‘free lunch’. An often raised concern about the experimental
method is the presumed lack of external validity of the obtained results. This is indeed
a serious concern, in particular, when one aims at using the experimental method for
informing public policy. I shall therefore come back to this issue at the end of the paper.
There are two hard and fast principles which experimental economists subscribe to
and which also differentiate economic experiments from most experiments in psychology
and marketing. Firstly, in economic experiments the monetary earnings subjects receive
depend in a transparent way on the choices made by the subjects. The reason for the
application of this principle is that it is one story to merely tell what one would do in a
particular situation, but another story to actually take a particular action if it is linked with
monetary consequences (for evidence that monetary incentives indeed make a difference
see, e.g., Camerer and Hogharth, 1999; Forsythe et al., 1994). Secondly, deception of
subjects is effectively banned. The main reason being that once deception is used it is
likely that it will leak out. Subsequently the knowledge of being deceived will spread
through the subject population, which seriously undermines an important advantage of
experiments, namely having control over the information and knowledge subjects have
concerning the economic situation they are in. For a discussion of the effects and costs
of using deception in experimental research see, e.g., Ortmann and Hertwig (2002) and
Jamison et al. (2008).
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“But also needed is imagination to create from these hints the great general-
izations to guess at the wonderful, simple, but very strange patterns beneath
them all, and then to experiment to check again whether we have made the
right guess.” (Feynman, 1964, chapter 1)
Behavioral economics is not a synonym for experimental economics although they share
some common grounds. Initially behavioral economics strongly relied on empirical evi-
dence generated in psychological and economic experiments. Nowadays, behavioral eco-
nomics defines itself broader as an approach incorporating evidence - not necessarily ex-
perimental - from psychology and other disciplines to explore the limits of existing models
of behavior and create new simple ones that can explain actual behavior in a better way
than current models are able to. Importantly, behavioral economics does not abandon
the disciplining strict formality which distinguishes traditional theoretical economic mod-
eling from ‘softer’ approaches in some other social sciences. It also does not try to fit
a new model for each new behavioral anomaly or regularity but rather seeks for parsi-
monious models and themes that can be applied to many different domains. Behavioral
economics is also not another sub-discipline, next to labor economics, public economics or
all the other sub-economics, but understands itself as a modeling approach which should
be applicable to a wide range of economic questions. The ultimate aim being “generating
theoretical insights, making better predictions ..., and suggesting better policy.” (Camerer
and Loewenstein, 2004, p. 3) In particular, the latter is also theme of this contribution.
3 Examples of behavioral regularities
3.1 Presentation and framing effects
Traditional economic reasoning is usually silent about possible effects of the presentation
or framing of a decision situation. For instance, from the viewpoint of revealed preference
theory it simply does not matter whether one has to make choices in sequence or simul-
taneously. Rational economic man and woman will always choose according to their true
preferences. These preferences are assumed to be well-behaved, coherent and invariant
with respect to superficial variations in the way a choice problem is presented. However,
one might start to wonder then why grocery and other stores are pricing their products
that often with 9.90, 19.99 and similar - just a little bit below round number - prices. Is
this just co-incidence and does it happen that the true marginal costs of all theses products
are exactly these prices? Probably not.
Let me pose the problem more concretely by discussing an example, taken (and
adopted) from Simonson (1990) who was among the first to demonstrate with the help of
an experiment that it may greatly matter whether consumers have to choose from an array
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of products simultaneously or sequentially. Suppose, one is entering a grocery store today
and this store offers to choose one snack out of six different brands of snacks for free.3
The same happens in one week from today and in two weeks from today. Hence, in each
subsequent week one is free to choose the most preferred snack for free. Now, consider
another grocery store that also offers free snacks for the next three weeks, again one per
week. However, in this store the rule for choosing the free snack is slightly different. Here
one has to choose today which brand of snack one would like to receive today, which one
to receive in one week, and which one to receive in two weeks. Thus, the only difference
is that in the second store one chooses today for today and the next two times whereas in
the first store one decides in each week on the spot.
When facing such offers, for a homo economicus, doing the right thing is a pretty
straightforward decision. Just choose the most preferred brand. Note, that this does not
mean that one is going to choose the same brand for each of the three weeks, because one
might like variety in snacks. Importantly, however, whether the decision has to be made
simultaneously or sequentially should not make a difference. Consequently, it should not
matter if one is confronted with the choice sequentially three weeks in a row as in the first
store or if one has to choose at once for all three weeks as in the second store. One might
not choose the same snack in each week, however, the variety of snacks one chooses should
not differ under the two conditions. Now, the question asked was if real consumers act in
this way. At least, students in a laboratory study (Simonson, 1990) did not do that. In
the sequential choice (grocery store 1) condition only 9 percent chose a different snack in
each week whereas in the simultaneous choice for sequential consumption (grocery store
2) condition this was the case for 64 percent of participants. These are by no means small
differences and even a skeptic should be ready to admit that these results are hard to
reconcile with the assumption of stable and/or coherent preferences. In a follow-up study
Simonson and Winer (1992) corroborated the laboratory findings in the field by using
scanner data of actual yogurt purchases in a grocery store. They find that the variety
of flavors chosen significantly increases with the number of purchases per occasion. The
observed choices in the laboratory and the store strongly indicate that revealed preferences
systematically depend on the way the choice set is presented. A dependence not accounted
for in traditional economic models.4
A second prominent example which probably casts even more doubt on the assump-
3If one does not like snacks at all it can be replaced by brands of other products, e.g. beer or yogurt.
4These observations are consistent with the concept of ‘choice bracketing’ and its specific consequence
of ‘taste change’ (Read et al., 1999). The former refers to the fact that the way people make decisions,
narrowly or broadly, affects their choices. The latter refers, specifically, to the effect that the choice
people make today can change their tastes and, hence, influence their choices in the future. The emergent
property of ‘diversification bias’ seems to be a robust phenomenon and is replicated in several studies (see
Read et al., 1999, p. 178).
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tion of coherent and stable preferences is the famous study, known as the ‘Asian disease’
problem, by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Tversky and Kahneman conducted ques-
tionnaire studies with students (Stanford University and University of British Columbia)
where they asked them to indicate their preference concerning different programs proposed
to combat an unusual Asian disease. To study potential framing and presentation effects
the problem was presented in two economically equivalent but presentational different
formulations. Figure 1 reproduces the original text.
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
Problem 1: [N = 152]
If Program A is adopted, 200 people
will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3
probability that 600 people will be
saved, and 2/3 probability that no peo-
ple will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Problem 2: [N = 155]
If Program A (C) is adopted, 400 peo-
ple will die.
If Program B (D) is adopted, there is
1/3 probability that nobody will die,
and 2/3 probability that 600 people will
die.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Figure 1: The ‘Asian disease’ problems of Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
Problem 1 presents the decision situation in a positive frame by emphasizing that lives
can be saved. Problem 2, in contrast, presents the very same options in a negative frame
by emphasizing that some people will have to die. Obviously, Programs A in Problem 1
and 2 are identical since in both cases 200 people will be saved and 400 people will die for
sure. The same is true for Programs B, where in both problems 200 people will be saved
and 400 people will have to die, in expectations. Hence, whatever people like more, there
should be no significant difference in revealed preferences between the two problems.
Figure 2 depicts the frequency of actual choices. When confronted with Problem 1
(positive frame) an overwhelming majority of 72 percent opts for program A that saves
200 people for sure whereas only 28 percent opts for the risky program where 200 people
are saved only in expectations. When confronted with Problem 2 a dramatic shift in
revealed preferences occur. Now, only a minority of 22 percent goes for the sure outcome
of 400 dead people but 78 percent are ready to accept the risky choice where 400 people
die only in expectations. It should be obvious that such a strong framing effect effectively
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inducing ‘revealed preference reversal’ is hard to square with the assumption of coherent
and stable preferences.
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Figure 2: Actual choices in ‘Asian disease’ problems (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)
The offered options in the Tversky and Kahneman study are both rather undesirable, in
the sense that one has to choose between sacrificing more or less people. Unfortunately, this
makes them representative for many decisions made in the public domain. Consider, for
instance, public investment decisions, especially, investment in infrastructure concerning
safety. The decision not to invest in more secure highways or railway infrastructure means
to effectively decide to accept deaths that otherwise could have been avoided. Similarly,
not investing into research for an influenza vaccine means to risk avoidable deaths in case
of an outbreak of influenza. Many more examples could be given from airport security to
school crossing guards (‘lollipop man’).5
3.2 Morality and reciprocity
“ ... in situations where self-interest and ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in
conflict. Much of the time, most of the time in fact, the self-interest theory ... will win.”
(Stigler, 1980, p. 176)
Although the neoclassical concept of utility is broad and flexible (critics might even
say tautological and hence without content) and, therefore, in principle not restricted to
narrow selfish preference orderings, most work and almost all applications in (public) eco-
nomics assume that people are narrow-minded selfish material wealth maximizers. One
5A nice and rather harmless example where the management of a semi-public enterprise seems to take
framing effects into account is the following: since only recently the Dutch railways do not use the word
‘delay’ any more when announcing that a train arrives late at the railway station. Instead, the phrase
that “the train will arrive in a few minutes” is used.
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might argue that, as long as models based on the assumption of narrow self-interest de-
scribe behavior of real people sufficiently well and, hence, make correct predictions that
can be used to evaluate and validate public policy there seems to be no reason to abandon
such models. This is precisely the argument endorsed by Milton Friedman, who argues that
first, theories should be judged by the accuracy of their predictions, and second, theories
should not be judged by the accuracy of their assumptions (Camerer, 2005). However, if
not only the basic assumptions are counter-intuitive (and empirically proven to be wrong)
but also the models’ predictions incorrect or at least misleading then this approach is in
deep trouble.
In the following I shall describe two prominent simple games where models based on
narrow material self-interest turned out to do a bad job in predicting actual behavior.
These examples will show that fairness considerations and, in particular, an inclination
towards reciprocal behavior are important constituents of human behavior. I shall distin-
guish between negative reciprocity and positive reciprocity. Negative reciprocity describes
the tendency to respond to an unkind act with an unkind act, whereas positive reciprocity
describes a kind response to a kind course of action.6 The following examples will make
this differences clear.
3.3 Negative reciprocity - the (mini) ultimatum game.
The ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) can be interpreted as a negotiation or bargain-
ing situation that is stripped down to its most important constituents. It is a situation
involving two people where one individual can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other
individual who can, indeed, take it or leave it.7 Figure 3 depicts - for the sake of the argu-
ment - an even further boiled down version of the originally investigated ultimatum game
(adapted from Falk et al., 2003). There one player, say Peter, has received 10 euro which
he has to split between himself and, say Rita, in a take-it-or-leave-it way. If Rita accepts
the offer both receive money according to the proposal. If she rejects both, hence Peter
and Rita, do not receive any money. For simplicity, Peter is given only two possibilities
how to split the money. He can make a rather unkind offer, “I take 8 and you get 2”,
leaving most of the money for himself or he can decide to be kind and propose to split
the money evenly, “I take 5 and you get 5”. Rita, faced with one of these offers, has to
6In a sense positive and negative reciprocity may be viewed as just two sides of the same medal, since
a non-unkind act is obviously a kind act. However, different emotions may be involved (e.g., anger vs
joy) with negative and positive reciprocity, which is likely to make the responses psychologically and
physiologically different. Additionally, reference points of fairness are important for the judgment of kind
and unkind behavior.
7Note that such (or similar) situations are not uncommon in everyday life. For instance, it is akin to
shopping in Western supermarkets or shops where one is usually not negotiating the price of the product
but rather takes it or leaves it (on the shelves).
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decide whether to accept the offer or to turn it down. Traditional economics assuming
narrow selfishness tells us that, because more money is better than less money, Rita will
accept any offer. In terms of the figure it means that Rita will be kind (accept) after a
kind proposal (5,5) and will also be kind (accept) after an unkind proposal (8,2).
Peter
Rita Rita
unkind
Peter: “I take 8 you get 2.”
kind
Peter: “I take 5 you get 5.”
8
2
0
0
5
5
0
0
kind unkind kind unkind
Figure 3: The mini ultimatum game
The empirical facts, however, deviate significantly from this prediction. A typical,
qualitatively and quantitatively representative, result generated in many experiments is
shown in Figure 4. It shows the percentage of accepted and rejected offers for both
possible proposals. As one would expect the kind proposal of (5,5) is never followed by
the unkind response of a rejection. The situation looks quite differently, however, if an
unkind proposal of (8,2) is put on the table. Such a proposal is often followed by an unkind
response, namely rejection. In the reported experiment this happens in more than 40% of
the cases. It is important to see that the unkind response is costly, leaving both players
without any monetary gain. This is precisely what makes it incompatible with traditional
economic reasoning assuming narrow selfishness.8
8Actually, the rejection rates for offers of only about 20 percent of the whole pie are usually higher
than the 40 percent reported here. A likely reason is that Falk et al. (2003) applied the so-called strategy
method where subjects have to decide upon acceptance and rejection before they know the actual choice.
That is, they make their decision in a cold (emotional) state, whereas responses to actual offers are made
in hot (emotional) states (see Loewenstein, 1999).
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Figure 4: Acceptance and rejection rates in mini ultimatum game (data source: Falk et al.
(2003))
3.4 Positive reciprocity - the gift-exchange game.
Probably the best known example for the existence of a predisposition towards positive
reciprocity stems from a game coined gift-exchange game.9 In economics, the basic idea
behind this game dates back (at least) to Akerlof (1982), who argued that gift-exchange
is an important constituent of labor contracts that are genuinely incomplete. The incom-
pleteness of the contract refers to the fact that the effort exerted by an employee is often
not verifiable because it cannot be observed by the employer and/or not be enforced by a
third party. Akerlof’s theoretical model, however, relied on assumptions about economic
behavior of employees that are at odds with the assumption of narrow selfishness. Namely,
that employees respond to higher wages positively, in the sense that higher wages make
them exert higher and more costly effort.
In Fehr et al. (1993) (see also Fehr et al., 1997, 1998) this idea is put to a test in the
experimental laboratory. In fact, the implemented situation more generally represents any
kind of patron-client or principal-agent relationship where contracts cannot be (perfectly)
enforced. More concretely, consider the following situation (based on Riedl and Tyran,
2005): A number of people is divided into a set of ‘employers’ (‘buyers’) and a (larger)
set of ‘employees’ (‘sellers’). The rules of the game are as follows. If an employer hires
an employee who provides effort, e, and receives a wage w, then the employer’s earnings
π are 30 + 10e − w. That is, the employer earns a lump-sum of 30 plus 10 times the
effort e exerted by the employee minus the wage w paid. The wage is between 1 and 100
(1 ≤ w ≤ 100) and the effort between 1 and 10 (1 ≤ e ≤ 10). The earnings u to the
9A game very similar in nature is the so-called trust game (Berg et al., 1995).
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employee is then the wage, w, he receives minus a ‘cost of effort’, c(e) = e plus some
lump-sum payment of 4 (u = w − e + 4). The sequence of actions is as follows. The
employer first offers a ‘contract’ specifying a wage w. When the contract is signed the
employee receives the wage before exerting any effort. Only, after the wage is paid out the
employee decides on his effort, where he is completely free to choose any level of effort.
Importantly, each employer-employee interaction is anonymous and essentially one-shot.
That is, there is no possibility for reputation building or retaliation.
What will be the outcome of such an interaction? Consider first the employee who
has received a wage and has now to decide on the effort level. Under the assumption of
narrow selfishness, any employee will choose the effort level with the lowest cost, e = 1,
no matter how high or low the wage received is. In effect, choosing a higher effort level
only decreases his total earnings. A rational and selfish employer will perfectly anticipate
this behavior and, hence, offer the lowest possible wage, w = 5, which is still accepted.10
However, in the experiment this predicted outcome is very rarely observed. Moreover,
gift exchange is observed as a very strong behavioral regularity. Figure 5 illustrates this.
The figure plots, on the vertical axis, the (average) effort chosen by the employees on
the average wage offered by the employers, on the horizontal axis. Under the assumption
of narrow self-interest employees should always choose the lowest effort level implying
no positive (or negative) relationship between effort and wages. This is reflected by the
straight line running through e = 1. The actual data, however, show a strikingly different
pattern: effort is clearly and strongly increasing with the wage received. In the figure this
is reflected by the increasing line, which connects average effort levels for wages smaller
20, between, 21 and 40, 41 and 60, and larger than 61. Hence, in conclusion this and
many other studies (for a recent review see Fehr et al., 2009) clearly show that people
respond positively reciprocal. An important side effect of the observed gift exchange is
that it increases efficiency (in terms of surplus maximization) and decreases inequality in
earnings, in comparison to the benchmark outcome predicted under traditional behavioral
assumptions.
4 Behavioral regularities, public economics, and pub-
lic policy
One might wonder what all of this has to do with public economics and public policy.
In the following I shall argue that the described behavioral regularities can indeed be of
eminent importance for public economics and policy.
10An employee without a contract receives a payment of 4.
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Figure 5: Gift exchange in an experimental labor market (source: Riedl and Tyran (2005))
4.1 On the interaction between trading institutions, morality,
and tax-shifting.
An interesting and important example where economic institutions and inclinations to-
ward reciprocity interact in a non-trivial way is the case of tax liability side equivalence.
Tax liability side equivalence is a basic tenet in public economics. It states that the statu-
tory incidence, that is who is legally responsible to pay a tax, is irrelevant for economic
incidence, that is who actually bears the tax burden. In the words of one of the authorities
in public economics, Richard A. Musgrave,
“it is a matter of indifference whether a general tax on transactions is assessed
on the seller’s or on the buyer’s side of the market” (Musgrave, 1959, p. 351).
Importantly, under traditional economic assumptions this holds true independently of
the trading environment (monopoly, oligopoly, competition, or bargaining) provided that
prices can in principle adjust freely. Interestingly enough, however, much of the public
debate about tax burden (and subsidy benefit) in the media and the political arena is
often much concerned with statutory instead of economic incidence. This rises the question
whether the public reasoning or the professional economic reasoning is incorrect. For public
policy the answer to this question is obviously important because it determines which
groups of the society are actually going to carry the burden of a tax, and, hence, what
the distributional and allocational consequences of a tax are. Neglecting the behaviorally
true tax burden and relying (only) on normative prescriptions that are based on incorrect
behavioral assumptions may, therefore, have very undesirable political and economical
consequences.
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To uncover the behaviorally true tax burden, ideally one would like to shift the statu-
tory tax burden from one side of the market, e.g. buyers, to the other side of the market,
e.g. sellers, leaving everything else equal. Naturally, such situations do not occur regularly
in the field. Fortunately, laboratory experiments are an ideal method to do precisely this.
The following shortly reports on three sets of experiments testing tax liability side equiv-
alence under three important economic institutions: competitive markets with complete
contracts, bargaining, and gift exchange markets.
Three studies (Borck et al., 2002; Kachelmeier et al., 1994; Ruffle, 2005) experimen-
tally investigate tax (and subsidy) liability side equivalence in competitive markets under
various trading mechanisms. The results of these experiments can simply be summarized
by: tax liability side equivalence holds in competitive experimental markets independent
of the trading institution. Traditional theoretical and behavioral tax incidence coincide.
Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) give an interesting twist to these results by study-
ing tax liability side equivalence in a simple bargaining environment. They modify the
ultimatum game (similar to the one described above) such that in case of acceptance of a
proposal one of the negotiators has to pay a tax from her gross earnings. In one treatment
the proposer has to pay the tax. In a second treatment the statutory tax burden is placed
upon the responder. If tax liability side equivalence holds the distribution of earnings
should be the same under both tax treatments. However, if statutory tax incidence im-
plies also a moral obligation to actually bear part of the tax burden then tax liability side
equivalence breaks down. It is well known that in bargaining situations reciprocity and
distributional fairness crucially influence behavior and economic outcomes. Hence, one
might expect that tax liability side equivalence is especially vulnerable in such situations.
Indeed, Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) find that the side of the transaction that
has to legally pay the tax also bears a disproportional part of the economic tax burden.
The observed incompleteness of tax shifting is also economically significant. When the
tax liability was taken from the responder and placed upon the proposer the offered net
(after tax) income for responders increased between 20% and 24%. In contrast, standard
tax liability side equivalence predicts no change in net income at all. Therefore, this is a
clear case where the interaction between trading institution and moral behavior interact
in a way traditional theory fails to predict.
Perfectly competitive markets and pure (two person) bargaining situations are at the
two extremes of actually existing economic exchange institutions. Although both are not
uncommon they are probably not the most frequent trading institutions. Rather, a mix-
ture of both seems to be the most common one. Gift exchange markets or markets with
incomplete (or even no) contracts, as described above, incorporate both elements: com-
petitive market interaction and bilateral bargaining. Riedl and Tyran (2005) investigate
tax liability side equivalence in such markets. In one set of experiments buyers are legally
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obliged to pay a tax and in another set of experiments sellers have the legal obligation to
pay the tax. If tax liability side equivalence holds then there should be no difference in
the outcomes of real variables between the two tax regimes. However, if moral obligations,
as in the study of Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), are important then the side on
which the tax is levied should also bear a relatively larger economic burden of the tax.
In gift exchange markets three important variables can be investigated: net prices, effort
and net earnings. Tax liability side equivalence may fail on each of these dimensions with
different consequences for the final distribution of income.
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Figure 6: Prices, effort, and earnings under the two tax regimes (source: Riedl and Tyran
(2005))
Figure 6 depicts average net prices and exerted efforts (panel (a)) and average net
earnings (panel (b)) for both, taxes levied on buyers and taxes levied on sellers. From
the figure it is obvious that there are no large differences between the two tax regimes
on all three dimensions of comparison. Furthermore, the observed small differences are
neither statistically nor economically significant. This is an important but also somehow
puzzling result given the observation that tax liability side equivalence breaks down in pure
bargaining and not when it is coupled with a competitive market. It strongly suggests
that the details of market interaction and perceptions about moral obligations to pay a
tax interact in a non-trivial way with real and economically significant results in terms of
tax shifting.
One conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that researchers as well as policy
makers should not solely rely on traditional economic theorizing when assessing the eco-
nomic burden of a tax. Additionally, the institutional environment and its interaction with
moral and reciprocal inclinations seems to be crucially determining the actual economic
outcome. Where the precise borders for predictive accuracy of the standard economic
model lie is still an open empirical question, though. If we want to understand under
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which circumstances tenets like tax liability side equivalence indeed hold or - more im-
portantly - have to be adapted we need a research program that systematically evaluates
such economic wisdoms.
4.2 Identifiable victims and hidden taxes.
Real outcomes can be non-trivially influenced not only by the interaction between insti-
tutional design of trading institutions and behavior of economic agents but also already
through pure presentation effects. In a 1968 article Thomas Schelling noticed that “[t]he
life you save may be your own” and that “the death of a particular person evokes anxiety
and sentiment, guilt and awe, ... [but that] ... most of this awesomeness disappears when
we deal with statistical death” (Schelling, 1968). This is probably the first account by an
economist pointing towards how different we perceive identifiable and statistical victims.
Loewenstein et al. (2006) take up this issue and examine the public policy consequences
of this human inclination of having stronger feelings towards an identifiable victim than
towards a statistical victim. They argue that from a welfare economics point of view
“people may be insufficiently sympathetic towards statistical victims”. Mainly psycholog-
ical research strongly supports the claim that individual concrete cases have a much more
powerful motivational effect than statistical cases. This seems to be the case even if the
statistics are objectively more informative than the individual case. A typical example in
this respect is that opinions about the abuse of welfare payments is shaped much more
strongly by individual experience than by objective statistics.11
An important public policy implication of the identifiability effect is that for politicians
‘hidden taxes’ tend to be much more popular than other taxes. For example, the value
added (or sales) tax is for most consumers (including economists) simply part of the
purchase price of a commodity, and, hence, has no identifiable victim. This concealment
may make it politically easier to raise value added taxes rather than more direct taxes. How
serious and economically important the misperception of hidden taxes is, is convincingly
shown by Chetty et al. (2009). These authors conduct a field experiment in a grocery store
where in one treatment the sales tax is made salient by explicitly showing it on the price
tag whereas in another treatment only the tax inclusive price is shown. The study finds a
significant 8 percent decrease in purchases and sales revenues when the tax is made salient.
This salience effect is corroborated with field empirical data using variations on taxes on
beer between different U.S. states. An important conclusion of this study is that it is
crucial to distinguish between tax elasticities and price elasticities when thinking about
tax policy; a distinction not necessary in traditional public economics.
11For clean evidence from the laboratory (dictator game giving) as well as the field (housing for needy),
see Small and Loewenstein (2003).
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Other prominent examples of hidden taxes are withholding income taxes which makes
people think that the money transferred to the tax authority is not their own and corpo-
rate income taxes which makes people belief that shareholders pay the tax although it is
mostly the factor labor that actually carries the tax burden (McCaffery, 1994; McCaffery
and Baron, 2006). In the mentioned examples the lack of identifiability makes the taxes
themselves as well as an eventual increase of them much more acceptable then it would be
the case for non-hidden taxes. The psychological appeal of hidden taxes is nicely summed
up by the aphorism of Russell Long, one of the most powerful and influential tax legislators
as chairman of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee “Don’t tax him, don’t tax me, tax the
man behind the tree.” (quoted after Small and Loewenstein, 2003)
Experimental and behavioral research has uncovered a number of other behavioral
regularities that are particularly important for taxation economics, like misperception of
the progessivity of the tax system, confusion of marginal and average income tax rates
or non-rationally high tax compliance rates (see, e.g., de Bartolome, 1995; Liebman and
Zeckhauser, 2004; Slemrod, 2006). In his contribution Slemrod (2010) discusses some of
these issues in more detail (for earlier accounts on taxation and behavioral economics see
McCaffery and Slemrod, 2006; Kirchler, 2007).
4.3 Endogenous preferences and competition.
One central assumption in economics is that people have “fixed lifetime preferences” (Bern-
heim and Rangel, 2007). In particular, this means preferences are assumed not to change
across states of nature or institutional constraints. In this perspective, preferences are
exogenously fixed and independent from the environment an individual is immersed in. In
contrast to this traditional view, Bowles (1998) argues vividly in favor of endogenous pref-
erences. He claims that our preferences are not well defined and stable but rather strongly
depended on the environment we have to deal with. However, all the evidence he puts
forward in support of his claims is either indirect or is open to alternative interpretations.
In a recent study, Brandts et al. (2008, 2009) experimentally test the influence of trad-
ing institutions on subjective well-being and (social) preferences directly. In a series of
experiments subjects are divided into two groups. One group interacts in a competition
free environment whereas subjects in the other group interact in a competitive environ-
ment. The hypothesis is that the experience of competition versus no competition per se
leaves its traces in subjects’ well-being (in the sense of Kahneman et al. (1997)’s ‘expe-
rienced utility’) and in their social preferences (that is, their ‘social disposition towards
others’). To test this hypothesis methods from social psychology are combined with ex-
perimental economics. At the beginning of the experiment subjects are asked to perform
a social value orientation test, which measures subjects’ social preferences by letting them
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allocate real money between themselves and some anonymous other person. The same
test is conducted also after subjects had experienced a competitive or a non-competitive
environment. Hence, social preferences are measured before and after the experience with
a particular trading institution. If traditional economic reasoning would be correct then
there should be (at least) no difference in the change of social orientation of subjects in
the competitive and those in the non-competitive environment. This is not what is found.
Firstly, there is a difference in the social orientation of subjects experiencing different in-
stitutions, and secondly, within the competitive institution the social orientation differs
strongly between subjects that experienced it in different roles (i.e., being on the long or
the short side of the trade relationship).
Figure 7 gives a visual impression of the differences in social preferences between the
competitive and the non-competitive environment. It shows the change in social orienta-
tions from before to after the experience with the competitive and the non-competitive
environment, respectively.12 Interestingly, under both trading regimes pro-social orienta-
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Figure 7: Change in social preferences in competitive and non-competitive environment
(source: Brandts et al. (2009, 2008))
tion deteriorates. Importantly, however, the decrease after the competitive experience is
more than three times as large as when subjects experience no competition. This clearly
indicates that preferences are indeed not - or at least only partly - exogenously given and
strongly shaped by subjects’ institutional experience. An additional result of this study
is that not only social orientation deteriorates under competition but that subjects’ also
suffer a loss of experienced utility (i.e. subjective well-being). Similar findings are reported
in a meta-study by Bowles and Polania Reyes (2009). The authors survey the data of 51
12For clarity of presentation only the average of the strongest change in social preferences among
subgroups across all investigated competitive environments is shown.
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experiments and find that explicit economic incentives aimed at the narrowly materially
selfish individual often not only have the intended effect of providing information and
suggesting socially appropriate behavior but also the unintended and unwanted effect of
comprising intrinsic motivation and self-determination. An important conclusion drawn
from reviewing these studies is that economic incentives and social preferences seem more
often complements than substitutes.
In public and political debates reforms aiming at more competition are often backed
with the received wisdom of traditional economics that consumers will be better off in the
presence of more competition. This argument refers to the notion of consumer surplus
which value is (in practice) measured only in purely material terms. This surplus may
indeed increase with more competition and less regulation (although in the experiment
discussed above even this is not the case). However, the ultimate aim of welfare economics
and public policy should be the maximization of the citizens’ well-being. In this sense,
the findings of deteriorating social orientations and suffering subjective well-being puts
question marks behind the supposedly purely positive effects of more competition and
less regulation. Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted measure of subjective well-
being developed, yet, and much more research into the measurement and determinants of
well-being is necessary.13
The evidence reported above also points to the important and not yet well understood
interplay between heterogeneous social preferences and institution design and formation.
There is mounting evidence that people differ quite substantially with respect to their
social preferences (e.g. Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fisman
et al., 2007; Bellemare et al., 2008), and there is also recent evidence that even subtle
institutional differences may alter behavior substantially (see, e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006;
Reuben and Riedl, 2009). However, evidence how these interact is only very recently
emerging (Kosfeld et al., 2009).
4.4 Presentation effects and public policy.
Finally, by closing the circle, let me give two examples where research into presentation
and framing effects can very concretely inform public policy and thereby increase general
well-being. The first one is taken from Amir et al. (2005) and highlights the importance
of whether a decision task is presented simultaneously or sequentially. In many places
police lineups are used to identify suspects of crime. In such a lineup eyewitnesses of
crimes attempt to recognize one person in a group of suspects standing next to each other
(Figure 8). Evidence from psychological research casts serious doubts on this much used
13Recently, some progress is booked concerning the measurement of subjective well-being. Kahneman
and Krueger (2006) introduce a measure based on self-reports of peoples’ emotional states (see also Brandts
et al., 2008).
18
Figure 8: Typical police lineup
method of identification. Lindsay and Wells (1985) designed a clever experiment and
showed that the likelihood of false identification of an innocent subject is much higher un-
der simultaneous than under sequential lineup. At the same time the frequencies of correct
recognition of the guilty suspect did not differ significantly between the two conditions.
This, together with subsequent research, clearly shows that in identification tasks - as
police lineups - the approach to present items or individuals one at a time leads to better,
less biased, judgments than the practice of presenting several individuals simultaneously.
The straightforward and unambiguous policy recommendation is, therefore, to abandon
simultaneous lineups in favor of sequential lineups. Actually, at least two U.S. American
states have adopted the alternative methodology.
The organization of organ donation is a another important domain where it has been
shown that framing effects can crucially alter behavior and, in this case, make the dif-
ference between life and death. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) investigate and compare
two different organ donation systems around the world. They distinguish between two
so-called no-action defaults. No-action defaults are the choices implicitly imposed on in-
dividuals who do not take an active decision. In the case of organ donation the most
widely used default decisions are “presumed-consent” and “explicit-consent”. Presumed-
consent means that people are assumed to be organ donors as long as they do not actively
indicate otherwise. Explicit-consent means that individuals have to actively register for
being a donor, otherwise they are not. The authors investigate the effective consent rates
for being a donor across the two defaults experimentally as well as by cross-country com-
parisons. Traditional economic theory assumes that preferences are fixed and known to
the economic agent, which implies that for effective consent rates it should not matter
whether one or the other default option is taken. Figure 9 shows the facts. The four
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Figure 9: Effective consent rates in countries with explicit consent (four leftmost bars)
and presumed consent (seven rightmost bars) (source: Science 302 2006 p.1338)
leftmost bars depict effective consent rates for four countries (Denmark, the Netherlands,
UK, and Germany, respectively) which apply the explicit-consent as default. The bars to
the right show effective consent rates for countries with presumed-consent as default. The
differences are striking. Whereas in the explicit consent countries the effective consent
rates are maximally 27.5 percent (the Netherlands), the minimum consent rate in coun-
tries with presumed consent is 85.9 percent (Sweden). These differences are surely too
large to be explained by effort or transaction costs of actively opting in and opting out
in the explicit consent and presumed consent countries, respectively. To exclude also this
potential explanation the authors conducted an experiment where effort and transaction
costs were virtually zero. In the experiment the difference in effective consent rates be-
tween the two default options is slightly smaller than in the cross-country study but still a
long way off from being equal. Interestingly, a neutral framing without any default led to
the same effective consent rate then the presumed consent default. This allows the con-
clusion that the unbiased ‘true’ preferences concerning organ donation are better elicited
with presumed consent then with explicit consent. That some policy makers are - at least
sometimes - aware of the fact that default options make a difference is nicely reflected in
arguments brought forward during a recent discussion about reforming the donor registra-
tion system in the Netherlands. In 2005 a coalition of parties in the parliament actually
did bring forward a motion that would have changed the explicit consent default into a
presumed consent default. At the end, however, there was not enough political support
for such a radical change of the donor registration system.14 In any event, this example
14A clear case of a presentation and framing effect is also reported in an article of the Dutch newspaper
NRC Handelsblad (September 2 & 3, 2006, pp. 41-42) about the Dutch immigration and naturalization
service (IND). The newspaper reports that if employees of the IND reject an application for a ‘temporary
residence permit’ they have to motivate their decision in written form. For the case of ‘hardships of
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highlights how insights from behavioral and experimental research are related to important
political decisions and can inform public policy more accurately than traditional economic
reasoning would be able to.
5 Further directions: the field and the brain
A common argument of skeptics against the use of laboratory experiments, in general,
and as a policy advice instrument, in particular, is its supposed lack of external validity.
This is indeed an important concern because if regularities observed in the laboratory
do not carry over to the field any conclusions and public policy advice drawn from these
experiments could be dangerously misleading. The potential problem of lack of external
validity is not unique to economic (or psychological) experiments, however.15 In physics,
the feather and the stone which fall with the same speed in vacuum but with different
speeds in ‘real life’ is a well-known illustrative example. As the wind may blow away the
feather outside the vacuum, in economic situations many factors one can control for in
the laboratory but not in the real world can influence behavior and blur or even wipe out
behavioral regularities observed in the laboratory. One way to tackle this problem, which
is unique to the experimental method, is to add pieces of real life context to the ‘dry’
laboratory environment in a systematic way. In this way one can trace if and how such
‘pieces of reality’ alter behavior.
Another important way to check for external validity is to replace the usual student
subjects with subjects who are experienced with the decision situation at hand and/or are
more representative than students. Such experiments have been conducted for a variety
of decision situations (see, e.g., Fehr and List, 2004; Egas and Riedl, 2008, among many
others). The general upshot from these experiments is that ‘experts’ often do not make
significantly different decisions than students in the same situation, although there are
sometimes subtle and surprising differences. For instance, Alevy et al. (2007) investigate
the behavior of financial market professionals regarding information cascades and find that
“professionals are less Bayesian than students” (ibid., p. 161) but report only little evidence
for differences in cascade formation. Haigh and List (2005) investigate the difference
in myopic loss aversion (MLA) between students and professional traders and find that
“traders exhibit behavior consistent with MLA to a greater extent than students” (ibid.,
p. 523, emphasis in original). Hence, sometimes behavioral regularities found with students
are even amplified with non-student subjects.
asylum seekers’ the IND employees have to motivate the decision if they accept the application. The result
being that cases of hardship are hardly ever positively assessed whereas temporary residence permits are
relatively easily issued.
15Note that theoretical reasoning is confronted with exactly the same potential lack of external validity.
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A third way to test external validity is to conduct ‘field experiments’. Field experi-
ments might be seen as a combination of the two already described ways, which pushes
them to their limits. Harrison and List (2004) provide a typology of field experiments
and define them, crudely speaking, as experiments where one is “recruiting subjects in the
field rather than in the classroom, using field goods rather than induced valuations, and
using field context rather than abstract terminology in instructions” (Harrison and List,
2004, p. 1009-1010). Field experiments are indeed an important complementary method
in research that is especially concerned with policy advice. In the ideal case, an economic
policy reform is evaluated with all possible scientific methods before a political decision is
made. That is, theoretically, experimentally in the lab- and the field, and with traditional
applied econometrics. It should be obvious that a thorough scientifically sound examina-
tion of a policy reform that reduces the risk of implementing false policies is much cheaper
(at least in expectations) than the costs of an actually implemented false policy. A rare
example of a first - albeit incomplete - attempt of such a scientific approach to policy
issues is the evaluation of the so-called “Plan Van Elswijk” in the Netherlands, which
proposes a radical reform of the (Dutch) financing system of unemployment benefits. In
the evaluation of this plan simulation studies, laboratory experiments and a small field ex-
periment were conducted (see van Winden et al., 1999, 2000; Riedl and Winden van, 2001,
2007, 2008, and the references therein). These studies produced a a rather clear picture
of the likely benefits and disadvantages of the proposed reform.16 An important lesson
learned from these studies is that laboratory experiments can indeed provide valuable in-
formation even for such complex questions as unemployment benefit reform plans. Thus,
one may safely conclude that laboratory experiments together with field experiments and
theoretical reasoning will play an important role in public policy advice in the future.17
A further - quite different - but potentially equally and in the long run probably even
more important but also more debated stream of research is the recent combination of
neuroscience with experimental and behavioral economics. This new research branch -
neuroeconomics - uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to study the biological founda-
tions of behavioral regularities observed in the laboratory and the field. Kevin McCabe,
one of the pioneers in this new field of the behavioral sciences defines it as follows:
“Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary research program with the goal
of building a biological model of decision making in economic environments.
[More specifically, it] is the study of how the embodied brain interacts with
its external environment to produce economic behavior. Research in this field
16At the end, despite the clear-cut results policy makers chose to interpret the results differently than
most involved researchers did and, to a large extent, ignored the scientifically achieved outcomes.
17An interesting recent example where laboratory experiments informed politics is given in Jacob K.
et al. (2005). For a survey of experiments for economic policy in the context of industry regulation, see
Normann (2004) and Hinloopen and Normann (2009).
22
will allow social scientists to better understand individuals’ decision making,
and consequently to better predict behavior.” (McCabe, 2003, p. 294)
At first sight this may sound abstract and relatively remote from public policy issues.
Indeed, in the above definition, the first part refers to the ‘pure scientific’ element of
neuroeconomics. The second part, however, reflects the potential of this approach for
public policy making. Having good models of human behavior is crucial for making good
predictions of human behavior in economic situations. Neuroeconomics has the potential
to significantly contribute to this quest for better models of economic decision making.
When evaluating the potential of this new emerging field one may want to recall the history
of game theory and laboratory experiments in economics. In its beginnings game theory
was largely dismissed as being too academic and thought to be useful at most for war
strategists but surely not for the analysis of ordinary economic interactions. Nowadays
game theory is used for policy advice at a large scale in many countries. (Recall, e.g., the
frequency auctions a few years ago where game theorists played a crucial role in designing
auction formats.) Later, experimental and behavioral economics was smiled at by many
economists because it was the received wisdom in economics that “economists ... cannot
perform ... controlled experiments” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985) a view that changed
quite a bit over the years as the following quote by the very same authors seven years later
testifies. There they state that experimental economics is an “exciting new development.”
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992). It is not unlikely that neuroeconomics awaits the same
‘fate’. Bernheim (2009) and Rustichini (2009) are recent critical appraisals of this new
development in economics.
In any event, both directions - towards the experimental field and towards the brain -
can be expected to be one of the most lively areas of research in economics, and both are
likely to produce results that will lead to better models, better predictions, better advice,
and ultimately - hopefully - also to better informed public policies.
In conclusion
In the course of this contribution I discussed a few areas in experimental and behavioral
economics that are of importance for public economics and public policy. Naturally, many
at least equally important issues were not even slightly touched upon. For instance,
voluntary contributions to public goods (see, e.g., Gächter and Herrmann, 2009), time
inconsistent intertemporal decision making, i.e., retirement decisions and pension systems
(see, e.g., Frederik et al., 2002), decision making under risk and uncertainty, i.e., health
insurance and social security in general (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Wakker et al.,
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2007), or the role of moral property rights in policy reform18 only to name a few. In
the future, also the fundamental issue of ‘welfare analysis beyond revealed preferences’ is
awaiting public economics research, and more generally, economic theory. First important
steps in this direction are made by (Bernheim and Rangel, 2009; Herings and Rohde,
2006).
In recent years, the ‘facts’ of behavioral regularities have been shown to be incompatible
with the traditional ‘fiction’ of economic theory. This has led to the development of new
theoretical approaches and models. It seems clear that for good public policy we need
both good accounts of the behavioral facts and a theoretical fiction that gives us the tools
to deal with the upcoming challenges in an accurate way.
18For an experimental account of the importance of moral property rights see, e.g., Gächter and Riedl
(2005).
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